Red Teaming/Adversary (Emu/)Simulation/Explicitly Pen testing stuff


Table of Contents


  • To Do
    • APT Data
    • CSharp stuff

General


Advanced Persistent Threat Actors & Data


Presentations/Talks/Videos

  • Interesting
  • Breaching the Perimeter
    • Cracking The Perimeter: How Red Teams Penetrate - Dominic Chell(BSidesMCR 2018)
    • Hacking Corporate Em@il Systems - Nate Power
      • In this talk we will discuss current email system attack vectors and how these systems can be abused and leveraged to break into corporate networks. A penetration testing methodology will be discussed and technical demonstrations of attacks will be shown. Phases of this methodology include information gathering, network mapping, vulnerability identification, penetration, privilege escalation, and maintaining access. Methods for organizations to better protect systems will also be discussed.
    • Traversing The Kill-Chain: The New Shiny In 2018 - Vincent Yiu - HITBGSEC 2018
      • Long gone are the days of easy command shells through PowerShell. Defenders are catching more than ever, forcing red teamers to up their game in new and innovative ways. This presentation will explore several new OSINT sources, techniques, and tools developed to accelerate and assist in target asset discovery and profiling. We will discover how some new advances in EDR has changed the general landscape of more mature organisations, and how red team tactics and procedures have been modified to bypass certain obstacles faced. Relevant techniques will be revised, modified and made great again.
  • Building a Team
    • Building and Leading Corporate Red Teams - Dale Pearson(x33fcon 2018)
      • Red Teaming often means different things to different people, so in this talk Dale shares with you what he believes to be Red Teaming in the Corporate world, what to be the foundational elements of establishing the support and buy in to put together an effective adversarial emulation capability, and how to lead it to success and evolve the capability over time.
  • Educational
    • Adversary Emulation and Red Team Exercises - Jorge Orchilles(2020)
    • The Impact of Dark Knowledge and Secrets on Security and Intelligence Professionals - Richard Thieme
      • Dismissing or laughing off concerns about what it does to a person to know critical secrets does not lessen the impact on life, work, and relationships of building a different map of reality than “normal people” use. One has to calibrate narratives to what another believes. One has to live defensively, warily. This causes at the least cognitive dissonance which some manage by denial. But refusing to feel the pain does not make it go away. It just intensifies the consequences when they erupt. Philip K. Dick said, reality is that which, when you no longer believe in it, does not go away. When cognitive dissonance evolves into symptoms of traumatic stress, one ignores those symptoms at one’s peril. But the very constraints of one’s work often make it impossible to speak aloud about those symptoms, because that might threaten one’s clearances, work, and career. And whistle blower protection is often non-existent.
    • Tactical Exploiation - H.D. Moore, Valsmith(Defcon15)
    • Red Team Methodology A Naked Look Jason Lang(Derbycon2019)
    • How to Start a Cyber War: Lessons from Brussels - Chris Kubecka(BSides Charm 2019)
      • A sanitized peek behind the diplomatic curtain, revealing challenges, decisions & tools at their disposal. The Vanguard cyber warfare exercises in Brussels involving EU & NATO member states. Nation-states leveraging software, hardware and human vulnerabilities into digital warfare, with devastating consequences. Embassy threats, leaked Intel agency tools, hacking back & mass casualties.
    • Game On! Using Red Team to Rapidly Evolve Your Defenses - Joff Thyer, Pete Petersen
      • This talk will be an enjoyable conversation with good beer, great bourbon, and terrific friends who are reliving the journey of infosec maturity from the perspective of both a penetration testing company and their client over a three year period. Details of various engagements will be discussed along with post-mortem analysis, lessons learned, as well as resulting mitigation tactics and defensive strategies. We will discuss the outcomes at each stage of rendered service and how both client and vendor adjusted their approach to re-engage again and again. The engagement culminates in Red Team exercises that clearly demonstrate the infosec evolution of the client. The talk will leave the defensive audience with a sense of hope, a list of achievable goals, and several tactics. The red team with get a glimpse into the maw of the blue future and the value of their tradecraft. Special brief guest appearances and commentary are expected from others in the community that assisted the client along the way as well.
    • Using blue team techniques in red team ops - Mark Bergman & Marc Smeets(BruCON 0x0A)
      • When performing multi-month, multi-C2teamserver and multi-scenario red team operations, you are working with an infrastructure that becomes very large quickly. This makes it harder to keep track of what is happening on it. Coupled with the ever-increasing maturity of blue teams, this makes it more likely the blue team is somewhere analysing parts of your infra and/or artefacts. In this presentation we’ll show you how you can use that to your advantage. We’ll present different ways to keep track of the blue team’s analyses and detections, and to dynamically adjust your infra to fool the blue team. We will first set the scene by explaining common and lesser known components of red teaming infrastructures, e.g. dynamic redirectors, domain fronting revisited, decoy websites, html-smuggling, etc. Secondly, we’ll show how to centralize all your infrastructure’s and ops’ information to an ELK stack, leaving it open for intelligent querying across the entire infrastructure and operation. This will also help with better feedback to the blue team at the end of the engagement. Lastly, we’ll dive into novel ways of detecting a blue team’s investigation and we’ll give examples on how to react to these actions, for example by creating honeypots for the blue team.
    • Attack Tactics 5: Zero to Hero Attack - Jordan Drysdale, Kent Ickler, John Strand(BHIS)
      • Ever want to see a full attack from no access on the outside to domain takeover? Ever want to see that in under an hour?; OWA? Password Sprays? Yup!; VPNs? Remote account takeover? Yup!; Fully documented command and tool usage? Yup!; MailSniper? Absolutely!; Nmap? Obviously!; Crackmapexec? Definitely!; Cobalt Strike HTA phishing? This is the one I am most worried about :D - but we'll try anyway. So what? What's different about this webcast? We'll cover the zero (external, no access) to hero (internal, domain admin).
    • RF for Red Team - David Switzer(BSides Tampa2020)
      • "This would be an overview of RF related detections / monitoring and attacks. This would go over current Wifi attacks (both attacking clients and networks), as well as wireless attacks on mice/keyboards (both the old ""mousejack"" and more modern "Logitacker" style attacks), as well as monitoring other systems for physical attacks, such as IoT/smart devices, alarm systems and power meters. - Wifi - General overview - Network attacks - Client attacks - PMKID cracking - Mousejacking and derivatives - IoT / Smart devices - Popular Comm - Cell - Pagers - Misc - Alarm systems - Power meters"
    • Passing the Torch: Old School Red Teaming, New School Tactics?
    • Red Teaming Windows: Building a better Windows by hacking it - MS Ignite2017
    • Breaking Red - Understanding Threats through Red Teaming - SANS Webcast
    • 'Red Team: How to Succeed By Thinking Like the Enemy' - Council on Foreign Relations - Micah Zenko
  • Lessons Learned
    • Hillbilly Storytime - Pentest Fails - Adam Compton
      • Whether or not you are just starting in InfoSec, it is always important to remember that mistakes happen, even to the best and most seasoned of analysts. The key is to learn from your mistakes and keep going. So, if you have a few minutes and want to talk a load off for a bit, come and join in as a hillbilly spins a yarn about a group unfortunate pentesters and their misadventures. All stories and events are true (but the names have been be changed to prevent embarrassment).
    • The hidden horrors that 3 years of global red-teaming, Jos van der Peet
      • My last 3 years of global reteaming in small and large organisations has shown me that there still are a lot of misconceptions about security. We all know the ‘onion’ model for layered security. While useful for the ‘defence in depth’ principle, this talk will show that in reality, rather than an onion, security is more like a pyramid. The basis is the hardware people work on (laptops etc.) and the top your business applications. In between is everything else. Operating system, network components, proxies, shares, servers and their software stack. Like any hi-rise structure, the top cannot be secure if the base is not secure. Defence in depth matters, but it can be quite trivial for attackers to sidestep certain controls to get to the data they want. Just securing your ‘crown-jewels’ is insufficient. This talk will revolve around how we have defeated security controls on various levels, ranging from the systems your end-users work on, all the way through to 2FA and 4-eye principles on critical business assets. It will talk about common misconceptions which lull companies into a false sense of security, while making life far too easy for attackers. For example the fallacy of focussing security efforts only/mostly on ‘crown jewels’ and how misunderstanding of why certain controls are put in place jeopardize corporate and client data. The talk will be supported by real-life examples
    • Purple Team FAIL! - Jason Morrow - Derbycon2017
      • What went wrong with the introduction of a red team discipline into fortune 1 and how the teams came together to course correct. The result has been a successful purple team that has driven the security posture forward at the world's leading retailer. This will cover some basic do's and don'ts along with new rules of engagement when integrating blue and red.
    • A Year In The Red by Dominic Chell and Vincent Yiu - BSides Manchester2017
    • Tips, Tricks, and Cheats Gathered from Red vs. Blue Team-Based Training - Ed Skoudis, Joshua Wright
    • Liar, Liar: a first-timer "red-teaming" under unusual restrictions. - Mike Loss(Kawaiicon2019)
    • One Hundred Red Team Operations A Year - Ryan O'Horo
    • Adversarial Emulation - Bryson Bort(WWHF19)
    • Common Assessment Mistakes Pen Testers and Clients Should Avoid - Brent White, Tim Roberts
      • Penetration assessments can be a stressful time for those involved. It’s a moment where the network admins find out if the network they manage, or maybe even helped to build, holds up against simulated attacks. Or, it’s a moment as a pen tester where you can help the client and strengthen their security posture, or screw things up by making a mistake - potentially losing a client and giving your company a black eye. However, this shouldn’t be a stressful time. As a client, it is important to understand why the test is taking place and how this helps. As a pentester it is important that you know what you are doing, need to ask for and aren’t just going in blind or throwing the kitchen sink at the network. This talk is to highlight common issues that we’ve either encountered or have have been vented to about from both the penetration tester’s side of the assessment as well as the client’s side. We’d like to bring these issues to light to hopefully help ensure a more smooth assessment “experience” for all parties involved.
  • Skills Improvement
    • Baselining Behavior Tradecraft through Simulations - Dave Kennedy(WWHF19)
      • With the adoption of endpoint detection and response tools as well as a higher focus on behavior detection within organizations, when simulating an adversary it's important to understand the systems you are targeting. This talk will focus on the next evolution of red teaming and how defeating defenders will take more work and effort. This is a good thing! It's also proof that working together (red and blue) collectively, we can make our security programs more robust in defending against attacks. This talk will dive into actual simulations where defenders have caught us as well as ways that we have circumvented even some of the best detection programs out there today. Let's dive into baselining behavior and refining our tradecraft to evade detection and how we can use that to make blue better.
    • Finding Diamonds in the Rough- Parsing for Pentesters
    • Skills for a Red Teamer - Brent White & Tim Roberts - NolaCon 2018
      • Want to incorporate hybrid security assessments into your testing methodology? What does going above and beyond look like for these types of assessments? How do you provide the best value with the resources and scope provided? What do some of these toolkits encompass? If you’re interested in what skills are needed for a Red-Teamer, or taking your red teaming assessments to the next level, here’s the basic info to get you started. We’ll discuss items of importance, methodology, gear, stories and even some tactics used to help give you an edge.
    • Rethink, Repurpose, Reuse... Rain Hell - Michael Zupo
      • What Hacker doesn’t like james bond type gadgets? Like the all in one, one in all tool that can get you out of (or into) all sorts of jams, and is just plain cool to tinker with. Like Glitch from reboot! Well chances are you have several already at your fingertips, there are countless out there with more powerful ones arriving daily. The pace at which new wireless devices are released is blistering fast, leaving many perfectly good “legacy” devices around for testing. This talk will walk you through and further the discussion of modding these devices with readily available tools to quickly turn them into mobile hack platforms. Think PwnPad but without the $900 price tag. Going into whats worth your time and what's not. The possibilities are there if you so choose! Need all the power of your desktop or maybe just a few specific tools? Whatever your aim, this talk will point it further in the right direction
    • Cons and Conjurers Lessons for Infiltration - Paul Blonsky(BSides Cleveland2016)
      • I will examine how the techniques of con artists and magicians are relevant to physical penetration testing, social engineering and infiltration. Focus is on some classic cons and basics of stage magic deception.
    • Red vs Blue: The Untold Chapter - Aaron Herndon, Thomas Somerville(GRRCon2018)
      • This talk focuses on a single attack chain within a simulated network, jumping back and forth between teh thought process ofa Red Teamer (Aaron) and the Blue Teamer (Tom).
    • Red Teaming in the EDR age - Will Burgess - WWF HackFest 2018
    • Red Team Operating in a Modern Environment: Learning to Live Off the Land - Und3rf10w
    • Red Team Operating in a Modern Environment: Learning to Live Off the Land - und3rf10w

Cobalt Strike


Command, Control, Communicate (or just CnC, or C3)

  • General Stuff
  • C2 Development
    • See Offensive Development
    • Articles/Blogposts/Writeups
    • Talks/Presentations/Videos
      • C3CM: Defeating the Command - Control - and Communications of Digital Assailants
        • C3CM: the acronym for command- control- and communi - cations countermeasures. Ripe for use in the information security realm, C3CM takes us past C2 analysis and to the next level. Initially, C3CM was most often intended to wreck the command and control of enemy air defense networks, a very specific military mission. We-ll apply that mindset in the context of combating bots and other evil. Our version of C3CM therefore is to identify, interrupt, and counter the command, control, and communications capabilities of our digital assailants. The three phases of C3CM will utilize: Nfsight with Nfdump, Nfsen, and fprobe to conduct our identification phase, Bro with Logstash and Kibana for the interruption phase, and ADHD for the counter phase. Converge these on one useful platform and you too might have a chance deter those who would do you harm. We-ll discuss each of these three phases (identify, interrupt, and counter) with tooling and tactics, complete with demonstrations and methodology attendees can put to use in their environments. Based on the three part ISSA Journal Toolsmith series: http://holisticinfosec.blogspot.com/search?q=c3cm&max-results=20&by-date=true
      • Flying a False Flag: Advanced C2, Trust Conflicts, and Domain Takeover - Nick Landers(BHUSA2019)
        • This talk will discuss the methodology, selection process, and challenges of modern C2. It will cover the details of recent HTTP/S advancements and tooling for new cloud service primitives such as SQS, AppSpot, S3, and CloudFront. We will demonstrate how trust can be abused for stealthy C2 techniques via internal mail servers, defensive platforms, and trusted domains. We will also cover the various options for domain takeover, and release tooling for exploiting domain takeover scenarios in Amazon Web Services (AWS), Azure, and Google Cloud Platform (GCP).
        • Code
    • Tools
      • Callback Catcher
        • Callback Catcher is a multi-socket control tool designed to aid in pentest activities. It has a simple web application with an backend API that allows the user control what TCP and UDP sockets should be opened on the server. It records any and all data send to the exposed sockets and logs it to a database which can be easily accessed via it's backend API. Itís kind of intended to be like the love child of Burp Collaborator and Responder. Alternatively think of it like a low/medium interactive honeypot. Its been coded on top of the Django REST framework, which offers a number of benefits , primarily being able to create your own client scripts and tools and quickly searching and filtering of data. Opening of sockets is built on top of Python's ServerSocket library. Upon spinning up a socket a user is given the option to assign a handler to the socket, which is affectively user defined code that overwrites the handler function within the SocketServer.TCPServer and SocketServer.UDPServer classes. This code tells the socket how to handle the incoming data and what to respond with. Each connection to the socket is recorded to a database.
      • CheckPlease
        • Implant-Security modules written in PowerShell, Python, Go, Ruby, C, C#, Perl, and Rust.
      • emptynest
        • Emptynest is a plugin based C2 server framework. The goal of this project is not to replace robust tools such as Empire, Metasploit, or Cobalt Strike. Instead, the goal is to create a supporting framework for quickly creating small, purpose built handlers for custom agents. No agent is provided. Users of Emptynest should create their own agents that implement minimal functionality and can be used to evade detection and establish a more robust channel. An example of an agent might support Unhooking, DLL Unloading, and code execution. Due to the simple nature of this project, it is recommended that agents be kept private.
      • RemoteRecon
        • RemoteRecon provides the ability to execute post-exploitation capabilities against a remote host, without having to expose your complete toolkit/agent. Often times as operator's we need to compromise a host, just so we can keylog or screenshot (or some other miniscule task) against a person/host of interest. Why should you have to push over beacon, empire, innuendo, meterpreter, or a custom RAT to the target? This increases the footprint that you have in the target environment, exposes functionality in your agent, and most likely your C2 infrastructure. An alternative would be to deploy a secondary agent to targets of interest and collect intelligence. Then store this data for retrieval at your discretion. If these compromised endpoints are discovered by IR teams, you lose those endpoints and the information you've collected, but nothing more.
      • Nuages
        • Nuages aims at being a C2 framework in which back end elements are open source, whilst implants and handlers must be developed ad hoc by users. As a result, it does not provide a way to generate implants, but an open source framework to develop and manage compatible implants that can leverage all the back end resources already developed.
        • Tutorial: Creating a custom full featured implant(Nuages)
    • C3
      • 101
        • C3 - Custom Command and Control - FSecure Labs
        • C3
          • C3 (Custom Command and Control) is a tool that allows Red Teams to rapidly develop and utilise esoteric command and control channels (C2). It's a framework that extends other red team tooling, such as the commercial Cobalt Strike (CS) product via ExternalC2, which is supported at release. It allows the Red Team to concern themselves only with the C2 they want to implement; relying on the robustness of C3 and the CS tooling to take care of the rest. This efficiency and reliability enable Red Teams to operate safely in critical client environments (by assuring a professional level of stability and security); whilst allowing for safe experimentation and rapid deployment of customised Tactics, Techniques and Procedures (TTPs). Thus, empowering Red Teams to emulate and simulate an adaptive real-world attacker.
      • Articles/Blogposts/Writeups
  • Other Frameworks besides Cobalt Strike and Empire
    • Appfell
      • Appfell
        • A cross-platform, post-exploit, red teaming framework built with python3, docker, docker-compose, and a web browser UI. It's designed to provide a collaborative and user friendly interface for operators, managers, and reporting throughout mac and linux based red teaming.
      • Poseidon
        • Golang Apfell Agent
    • Covenant
    • FudgeC2
      • FudgeC2
        • FudgeC2 is a Powershell command and control platform designed to facilitate team collaboration and campaign timelining. This aims to help clients better understand red team activities by presenting them with more granular detail of adversarial techniques. Built on Python3 with a web frontend, FudgeC2 aims to provide red teamers a simple interface in which to manage active implants across their campaigns.
    • Koadic
      • Koadic
        • Koadic, or COM Command & Control, is a Windows post-exploitation rootkit similar to other penetration testing tools such as Meterpreter and Powershell Empire. The major difference is that Koadic does most of its operations using Windows Script Host (a.k.a. JScript/VBScript), with compatibility in the core to support a default installation of Windows 2000 with no service packs (and potentially even versions of NT4) all the way through Windows 10.
      • Post Exploitation with KOADIC - Ian Kings
    • Mouse
      • Mouse
        • Mouse Framework is an iOS and macOS post-exploitation framework that gives you a command line session with extra functionality between you and a target machine using only a simple Mouse payload. Mouse gives you the power and convenience of uploading and downloading files, tab completion, taking pictures, location tracking, shell command executio…
    • NinjaC2
      • Ninja
        • Ninja C2 is an Open source C2 server created by Purple Team to do stealthy computer and Active directoty enumeration without being detected by SIEM and AVs , Ninja still in beta version and when the stable version released it will contains many more stealthy techniques and anti-forensic to create a real challenge for blue team to make sure all the defenses configured correctly and they can detect sophisticated attacks. Ninja use python to server the payload and control the agents . the agents are based on C# and powershell which can bypass leading AVs . Ninja comunicate with the agents in secure channel encrpyted with AES-256 and the key is not hard coded but randomly generated on the campaign start , every agent connect to the C2 get the key and if the C2 restarted a new key will be used by all old agents and the new. Ninja also randomize the callback URLs for every campaign to bypass static detection.
        • Introducing Ninja C2 : the C2 built for stealth red team Operations - Ahmed Khlief(2020)
    • Octopus
    • Shadow
      • shad0w
        • SHAD0W is a modular C2 framework designed to successfully operate on mature enviroments. It will use a range of methods to evade EDR and AV while allowing the operator to continue using tooling an tradecraft they are familiar with. Its powered by Python 3.8 and C, using Donut for payload generation. By using Donut along side the process injection capabilities of SHAD0W it gives the operator the ability to execute .NET assemblies, EXEs, DLLs, VBS, JS or XSLs fully inside memory. Dynamically resolved syscalls are heavily used to avoid userland API hooking, anti DLL injection to make it harder for EDR to load code into the beacons and offical microsoft mitigation methods to protect spawn processes.
        • Blogpost
    • SharpC2
    • Silent Trinity
      • SILENTTRINITY
        • SILENTTRINITY is modern, asynchronous, multiplayer & multiserver C2/post-exploitation framework powered by Python 3 and .NETs DLR. It's the culmination of an extensive amount of research into using embedded third-party .NET scripting languages to dynamically call .NET API's, a technique the author coined as BYOI (Bring Your Own Interpreter). The aim of this tool and the BYOI concept is to shift the paradigm back to PowerShell style like attacks (as it offers much more flexibility over traditional C# tradecraft) only without using PowerShell in anyway.
      • Hunting for SILENTTRINITY - Wee-Jing Chung(2019)
        • SILENTTRINITY (byt3bl33d3r, 2018) is a recently released post-exploitation agent powered by IronPython and C#. This blog post will delve into how it works and techniques for detection.
      • SILENTTRINITY - DarthSidious
        • Using Kali as a C2 Server
      • How to Use Silent Trinity - Bresaola 0.3.0dev - H4cklife!!
    • Sliver
      • Sliver
        • Sliver is a general purpose cross-platform implant framework that supports C2 over Mutual-TLS, HTTP(S), and DNS. Implants are dynamically compiled with unique X.509 certificates signed by a per-instance certificate authority generated when you first run the binary. The server, client, and implant all support MacOS, Windows, and Linux (and possibly every Golang compiler target but we've not tested them all).
  • Communication Channel Example PoCs
    • 404
    • ActiveDirectory Features
    • ARP
      • Zarp
        • Zarp is a network attack tool centered around the exploitation of local networks. This does not include system exploitation, but rather abusing networking protocols and stacks to take over, infiltrate, and knock out. Sessions can be managed to quickly poison and sniff multiple systems at once, dumping sensitive information automatically or to the attacker directly. Various sniffers are included to automatically parse usernames and passwords from various protocols, as well as view HTTP traffic and more. DoS attacks are included to knock out various systems and applications.
    • BITS
      • LOLBITS
        • LOLBITS is a C# reverse shell that uses Microsoft's Background Intelligent Transfer Service (BITS) to communicate with the Command and Control backend. The Command and Control backend is hidden behind an apparently harmless flask web application and it's only accesible when the HTTP requests received by the app contain a valid authentication header.
    • Browser
    • Cobalt Strike
      • External C2
        • A library for integrating communication channels with the Cobalt Strike External C2 server
    • DNS-based
      • C2 with DNS
      • dnscat2-powershell
        • A Powershell client for dnscat2, an encrypted DNS command and control tool
      • DNS-Persist
        • DNS-Persist is a post-exploitation agent which uses DNS for command and control. The server-side code is in Python and the agent is coded in C++.
    • Email
      • DicerosBicornis
        • A stealthy Python based Windows backdoor that uses email as a command and control server.
    • Google Translate
    • HTTP/S-based
      • PoshC2 v3 with SOCKS Proxy (SharpSocks)
      • PoshC2
        • Powershell C2 Server and Implants
      • Galvatron
        • Powershell fork of Monohard by Carlos Ganoza P. This botnet/backdoor was designed to egress over unecrypted web using very little, but effective obfuscation. Egress over ICMP and DNS are planned as features. Lastly, the server code is designed to setup the C2 on a LAMP-esque server. The default creds are admin/admin.
      • C2 with https
      • C2 over TLS Certs - Casey Smith
      • ThunderShell
        • ThunderShell is a Powershell based RAT that rely on HTTP request to communicate. All the network traffic is encrypted using a second layer of RC4 to avoid SSL interception and defeat network hooks.
      • FruityC2
        • FruityC2 is a post-exploitation (and open source) framework based on the deployment of agents on compromised machines. Agents are managed from a web interface under the control of an operator.
      • PlugBot-C2C
        • This is the Command & Control component of the PlugBot project
      • EggShell
        • EggShell is an iOS and macOS post exploitation surveillance pentest tool written in Python. This tool creates 1 line multi stage payloads that give you a command line session with extra functionality. EggShell gives you the power and convenience of uploading/downloading files, taking pictures, location tracking, shell command execution, persistence, escalating privileges, password retrieval, and much more. Server communication features end to end encryption with 128 bit AES and the ability to handle multiple clients. This is a proof of concept pentest tool, intended for use on machines you own.
        • EggShell Blogpost
      • A Guide to Configuring Throwback
    • HTTP2
      • Merlin
        • Merlin is a cross-platform post-exploitation HTTP/2 Command & Control server and agent written in golang.
    • ICMP
    • OCR
    • Office365
      • Callidus
        • Latin word for “sneaky” is called “Callidus”. It is developed for learning and improving my knowledge about developing custom toolset in C# and learning how to leverage cloud services for the benefit of the user. It is developed using .net core framework in C# language. Allows operators to leverage O365 services for establishing command & control communication channel. It usages Microsoft Graph APIs for communicating with O365 services.
      • Introduction to Callidus - 3xpl01tc0d3r(2020)
    • PAC
      • Pacdoor
        • Pacdoor is a proof-of-concept JavaScript malware implemented as a Proxy Auto-Configuration (PAC) File. Pacdoor includes a 2-way communication channel, ability to exfiltrate HTTPS URLs, disable access to cherry-picked URLs etc.
    • SSH
      • Spidernet
        • Proof of Concept of SSH Botnet C&C Using Python
    • Social Media-based
      • JSBN
        • JSBN is a bot client which interprets commands through Twitter, requiring no hosting of servers or infected hosts from the command issuer. It is written purely in javascript as a Proof-of-Concept for javascript's botnet potentials.
      • C2 with twitter
      • C2 with Telegram
      • BrainDamage
        • A fully featured backdoor that uses Telegram as a C&C server
      • twittor - twitter based backdoor
        • A stealthy Python based backdoor that uses Twitter (Direct Messages) as a command and control server This project has been inspired by Gcat which does the same but using a Gmail account.
      • Instegogram
      • canisrufus
        • A stealthy Python based Windows backdoor that uses Github as a command and control server.
    • SQL Server
    • Trello
      • TrelloC2
        • Simple C2 over the Trello API
    • WebDAV
    • Web Services
    • WebSockets
      • WSC2
        • WSC2 is a PoC of using the WebSockets and a browser process to serve as a C2 communication channel between an agent, running on the target system, and a controller acting as the actual C2 server.
      • [Using WebSockets and IE/Edge for C2 communications](https://arno0x0x.wordpress.com/2017/11/10/https://github.com/leoloobeek/GoG reen/blob/master/README.mdusing-websockets-and-ie-edge-for-c2-communications/)
      • MurDock - Mutable Universal Relay Document Kit
        • The purpose of this tool is to provide a protocol independent framework that contains a base set of features that can piggyback on top of any collaborative web platform or service. The base docClient and docServer are meant to be extended upon with Buffer classes written for individual web services. These buffer classes can be plugged into the MurDock framework in order to create a unique shell infrastructure that will always contains a base set of features, as well as the ability to tunnel over any web application traffic for which a buffer class has been constructed. The framework can be extended to operate over lower level protocols if desired.
      • PetaQ
        • PetaQ is a malware which is being developed in .NET Core/Framework to use websockets as Command & Control (C2) channels. It's designed to provide a Proof of Concept (PoC) websocket malware to the adversary simulation exercises (Red & Purple Team exercises).
    • WMI-based
      • WMImplant
        • WMImplant is a PowerShell based tool that leverages WMI to both perform actions against targeted machines, but also as the C2 channel for issuing commands and receiving results. WMImplant will likely require local administrator permissions on the targeted machine.
      • WheresMyImplant
        • A Bring Your Own Land Toolkit that Doubles as a WMI Provider
      • PowerProvider
        • PowerProvider: A toolkit to manipulate WMI. Used with WheresMyImplant
  • Papers

Domains and Domain Related Things


Egress/Exfiltration


Empire


HW Related/Physical Devices
  • Access
    • RDP
      • xrdp
        • xrdp provides a graphical login to remote machines using Microsoft Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP). xrdp accepts connections from a variety of RDP clients: FreeRDP, rdesktop, NeutrinoRDP and Microsoft Remote Desktop Client (for Windows, Mac OS, iOS and Android).
    • SSH
    • VPN
      • Penetration Testing Dropbox Part 2 - VPN Infrastructure - Casey Cammilleri
      • Wireguard
        • Wireguard - Wikipedia
          • WireGuard is a free and open-source software application and communication protocol that implements virtual private network (VPN) techniques to create secure point-to-point connections in routed or bridged configurations. It is run as a module inside the Linux kernel, and aims for better performance and more power saving than the IPsec and OpenVPN tunneling protocols. It was written by Jason A. Donenfeld and is published under the GNU General Public License (GPL) version 2.
        • wg-access-server
          • wg-access-server is a single binary that provides a WireGuard VPN server and device management web ui. We support user authentication, 1 click device registration that works with Mac, Linux, Windows, Ios and Android including QR codes. You can configure different network isolation modes for better control and more. This project aims to deliver a simple VPN solution for developers, homelab enthusiasts and anyone else feeling adventurous.
  • Dropboxes
  • Physical Implants
    • Articles/Writeups
    • Papers
      • [Stealthy Dopant-Level Hardware Trojans](Hardware level trojans http://sharps.org/wp-content/uploads/BECKER-CHES.pdf)
        • Abstract: In this paper we propose an extremely stealthy approach for implementing hardware Trojans below the gate level, and we evaluate their impact on the security of the target device. Instead of adding additional circuitry to the target design, we insert our hardware Trojans by changing the dopant polarity of existing transistors. Since the modied circuit ap- pears legitimate on all wiring layers (including all metal and polysilicon), our family of Trojans is resistant to most detection techniques, including negrain optical inspection and checking against \golden chips". We demonstrate the e ectiveness of our approach by inserting Trojans into two designs | a digital post-processing derived from Intel's cryptographically secure RNG design used in the Ivy Bridge processors and a side-channel resistant SBox implementation | and by exploring their detectability and their effects on security.
      • Implementation and Implications of a Stealth Hard-Drive Backdoor
        • Modern workstations and servers implicitly trust hard disks to act as well-behaved block devices. This paper analyzes the catastrophic loss of security that occurs when hard disks are not trustworthy. First, we show that it is possible to compromise the firmware of a commercial ovt-the-shelf hard drive, by resorting only to public information and reverse engineering. Using such a compromised firmware, we present a stealth rootkit that replaces arbitrary blocks from the disk while they are written, providing a data replacement back- door . The measured performance overhead of the compromised disk drive is less than 1% compared with a normal, non-malicious disk drive. We then demonstrate that a re- mote attacker can even establish a communication channel with a compromised disk to infiltrate commands and to ex-filtrate data. In our example, this channel is established over the Internet to an unmodified web server that relies on the compromised drive for its storage, passing through the original webserver, database server, database storage engine, filesystem driver, and block device driver. Additional experiments, performed in an emulated disk-drive environment, could automatically extract sensitive data such as /etc/shadow (or a secret key le) in less than a minute. This paper claims that the diffculty of implementing such an at- tack is not limited to the area of government cyber-warfare; rather, it is well within the reach of moderately funded criminals, botnet herders and academic researchers.
      • Inside a low budget consumer hardware espionage implant
    • HID
    • Tooling
      • USBsamurai For Dummies - Luca Bongiorni
      • whid-31337
        • WHID Elite is a GSM-enabled Open-Source Multi-Purpose Offensive Device that allows a threat actor to remotely inject keystrokes, bypass air-gapped systems, conduct mousejacking attacks, do acoustic surveillance, RF replay attacks and much more.
      • WiFiDuck
        • Wireless keystroke injection attack platform
      • Caligo
        • Caligo is a simple C2 for hostile "dropbox" devices management used in physical security assessments. We have been using drop devices for a long time now but we never had an easy way to manage them especially when running multiple engagements at the same time with multiple devices for each. Caligo solves this problem by providing a client and server setup script which allows the user to control all of the devices from a web application.
    • Blogpost
  • Other
    • PentestHardware
      • Kinda useful notes collated together publicly
    • PhanTap (Phantom Tap)
      • PhanTap is an ‘invisible’ network tap aimed at red teams. With limited physical access to a target building, this tap can be installed inline between a network device and the corporate network. PhanTap is silent in the network and does not affect the victim’s traffic, even in networks having NAC (Network Access Control 802.1X - 2004). PhanTap will analyze traffic on the network and mask its traffic as the victim device. It can mount a tunnel back to a remote server, giving the user a foothold in the network for further analysis and pivoting. PhanTap is an OpenWrt package and should be compatible with any device. The physical device used for our testing is currently a small, inexpensive router, the GL.iNet GL-AR150. You can find a detailed blogpost describing PhanTap here

Infrastructure


Payloads & Stuff

  • Creation & Development
  • Delivery & Staging
  • Keying
    • Keying
      • Articles
      • Talks/Presentations/Videos
        • Context-Keyed Payload Encoding: Fighting The Next Generation of IDS - Dimitris Glynos(AthCon2010)
          • Slides
          • Paper
          • Exploit payload encoding allows hiding maliciouspayloads from modern Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Although metamorphic and polymorphic encoding allow such payloads to be hidden from signature-based and anomaly-based IDS,these techniques fall short when the payload is being examined by IDS that can trace the execution of malicious code. Context-keyed encodingis a technique that allows the attacker to encrypt the malicious payload in such a way, that it canonly be executed in an environment (context) withspecific characteristics. By selecting an environment characteristic that will not be present during the IDS trace (but will be present on the target host), the attacker may evade detection by advanced IDS. This paper focuses on the current research in context-keyed payload encoding and proposes a novel encoder that surpasses many of the limitations found in its predecessors.
        • Advanced Payload Strategies: “What is new, what works and what is hoax?”
          • This talk focuses on the shellcode perspective and it’s evolution. From the simplest {shell}code to the polymorphism to bypass filters and I{D|P}S (which has lots of new ideas, like application-specific decoders, decoders based on architecture-instructions, and many others), passing through syscall proxying and injection, this talk will explain how it works and how effective they are against the new evolving technologies like network code emulation, with live demonstrations. There is long time since the first paper was released about shellcoding. Most of modern text just tries to explain the assembly structure and many new ideas have just been released as code, never been detailed or explained. The talk will try to fix this gap, also showing some new ideas and considering different architectures.
        • Genetic Malware: Designing Payloads for Specific Targets - Travis Morrow, Josh Pitts(2016)
        • Protect Your Payloads Modern Keying Techniques - Leo Loobeek(Derybcon2018)
          • Our payloads are at risk! Incident responders, threat hunters, and automated software solutions are eager to pick apart your new custom dropper and send you back to square one. One answer to this problem is encrypting your payload with key derivation functions ("keying") which leverages a variety of local and remote resources to build the decryption key. Throughout this talk I will present modern keying techniques and demo some tools to help along the way. I will start with showing how easy it is to discover attacker infrastructure or techniques in the payloads we commonly use every day. I will then quickly review how keying helps and the considerations when generating keyed payloads. Throughout the presentation many practical examples of keying techniques will be provided which can be used for typical pentests or full red team operations. Finally I will introduce KeyServer, a new piece to add to your red team infrastructure which handles advanced HTTP and DNS keying. Using unprotected payloads during ops should be a thing of the past. Let’s regain control of our malicious code and make it harder on defenders! This talk is based on the original research of environmental keying by Josh Pitts and Travis Morrow.
      • Papers
        • Environmental Key Generation towards Clueless Agents - J. Riordan and B. Schneier(1998)
          • In this paper, we introduce a collection of cryptographic key constructions built from environmental data that are resistant to adversarial analysis and deceit. We expound upon their properties and discuss some possible applications; the primary envisioned use of these constructions is in the creation of mobile agents whose analysis does not reveal their exact purpose.
        • Strong Cryptography Armoured Computer VirusesForbidding Code Analysis: the bradley virusEric Filiol(2004)
          • Imagining what the nature of future viral attacks might look like is the key to successfully protecting against them. This paper discusses how cryptography and key management techniques may definitively checkmate antiviral analysis and mechanisms. We present a generic virus, denoted bradley which protects its code with a very secure, ultra-fast symmetric encryption. Since the main drawback of using encryption in that case lies on the existence of the secret key or information about it within the viral code, we show how to bypass this limitation by using suitable key management techniques. Finally, we show that the complexity of the bradley code analysis is at least as high as that of the cryptanalysis of its underlying encryption algorithm.
        • Foundations and applications for secure triggers - Ariel Futoransky, Emiliano Kargieman, Carlos Sarraute, Ariel Waissbein(2006)
          • Imagine there is certain content we want to maintain private until some particular event occurs, when we want to have it automatically disclosed. Suppose, furthermore, that we want this done in a (possibly) malicious host. Say the confidential content is a piece of code belonging to a computer program that should remain ciphered and then “be triggered” (i.e., deciphered and executed) when the underlying system satisfies a preselected condition, which must remain secret after code inspection. In this work we present different solutions for problems of this sort, using different “declassification” criteria, based on a primitive we call secure triggers. We establish the notion of secure triggers in the universally composable security framework of Canetti [2001] and introduce several examples. Our examples demonstrate that a new sort of obfuscation is possible. Finally, we motivate its use with applications in realistic scenarios.
        • Context-keyed Payload Encoding: Preventing Payload Disclosure via Context - druid@caughq.org(2008)
        • Malicious cryptography. . . reloaded - Eric Filiol, Fr'ed'eric Raynal(CanSecWest2008)
        • Context-keyed Payload Encoding:Fighting the Next Generation of IDS - Dimitrios A. Glynos(2010)
        • Impeding Automated Malware Analysis with Environment-sensitive Malware - Chengyu Song, Paul Royal, Wenke Lee(2012)
          • To solve the scalability problem introduced by the exponential growth of malware, numerous automated malware analysis techniques have been developed. Unfortunately, all of these approaches make previously unaddressed assumptions that manifest as weaknesses to the tenability of the automated malware analysis process. To highlight this concern, we developed two obfuscation techniques that make the successful execution of a malware sample dependent on the unique properties of the original host it infects. To reinforce the potential for malware authors to leverage this type of analysis resistance, we discuss the Flashback botnet’s use of a similar technique to prevent the automated analysis of its samples.
        • Sleeping Your Way out of theSandbox - Hassan Mourad(2015)
          • In recent years,the security landscape has witnessed the rise of a new breed of malware, Advanced Persistence Threat, or APT for short. With all traditional security solutions failing to address this new threat, a demand was created for new solutions that are capable of addressing the advanced capabilities of APT. One of the offeredsolutions was file-based sandboxes,asolution that dynamically analyzes files and judgestheir threat levelsbased on their behavior in an emulated/virtual environment. But security is a cat and mouse game, and malware authors are always trying to detect/bypass such measures. Some of the common techniques used by malware for sandbox evasionwill be discussed in this paper. This paperwill also analyze how to turn somecountermeasuresused by sandboxes against it. Finally, itwill introduce some new ideas for sandbox evasion along with recommendationsto address them.
        • Hot Knives Through Butter: Evading File-based Sandboxes - Abhishek Singh, Zheng Bu(2014)
      • Tools
        • Metasploit
        • EBOWLA
          • Framework for Making Environmental Keyed Payloads
        • keyring
          • KeyRing was written to make key derivation functions (keying) more approachable and easier to quickly develop during pentesting and red team operations. Keying is the idea of encrypting your original payload with local and remote resources, so it will only decrypt on the target system or under other situations.
        • satellite
        • GoGreen
          • This project was created to bring environmental (and HTTP) keying to scripting languages. As its common place to use PowerShell/JScript/VBScript as an initial vector of code execution, as a result of phishing or lateral movement, I see value of the techniques for these languages.
        • keyserver
          • Easily serve HTTP and DNS keys for proper payload protection
        • Keyring
          • Proper Payload Protection Prevents Poor Performance. KeyRing was written to make key derivation functions (keying) more approachable and easier to quickly develop during pentesting and red team operations. Keying is the idea of encrypting your original payload with local and remote resources, so it will only decrypt on the target system or under other situations.
        • Spotter
          • Spotter is a tool to wrap payloads in environmentally-keyed, AES256-encrypted launchers. These keyed launchers provide a way to ensure your payload is running on its intended target, as well as provide a level of protection for the launcher itself.
  • Storage
  • Examples/Samples
    • File Clone
      • MetaTwin
        • The project is designed as a file resource cloner. Metadata, including digital signature, is extracted from one file and injected into another. Note: Signatures are copied, but no longer valid.
        • Blogpost
    • Batch Scripts
      • APT Simulator
        • APT Simulator is a Windows Batch script that uses a set of tools and output files to make a system look as if it was compromised
    • C/C++
    • C#
      • QuasarRAT
        • Quasar is a fast and light-weight remote administration tool coded in C#. Providing high stability and an easy-to-use user interface, Quasar is the perfect remote administration solution for you.
      • RedPeanut
        • RedPeanut is a small RAT developed in .Net Core 2 and its agent in .Net 3.5 / 4.0.
    • Go
    • JavaScript
    • Lua
    • PowerShell
      • Invoke-BSOD
        • A PowerShell script to induce a Blue Screen of Death (BSOD) without admin privileges. Also enumerates Windows crash dump settings. This is a standalone script, it does not depend on any other files.
      • PowerDropper
        • App that generates PowerShell dropper scripts for .NET executables
      • PowerStager
        • This script creates an executable stager that downloads a selected powershell payload, loads it into memory and executes it using obfuscated EC methods. The script will also encrypt the stager for dynamic signatures and some additional obfuscation. This enables the actual payload to be executed indirectly without the victim downloading it, only by executing the stager. The attacker can then for example implement evasion techniques on the web server, hosting the payload, instead of in the stager itself.
    • Python
      • Pupy
        • Pupy is an opensource, multi-platform Remote Administration Tool with an embedded Python interpreter. Pupy can load python packages from memory and transparently access remote python objects. Pupy can communicate using different transports and have a bunch of cool features & modules. On Windows, Pupy is a reflective DLL and leaves no traces on disk.
        • Pupy WebSocket Transport
      • RedSails
        • Python based post-exploitation project aimed at bypassing host based security monitoring and logging. DerbyCon 2017 Talk
      • stupid_malware
        • Python malware for pentesters that bypasses most antivirus (signature and heuristics) and IPS using sheer stupidity
      • Stitch
        • This is a cross platform python framework which allows you to build custom payloads for Windows, Mac OSX and Linux as well. You are able to select whether the payload binds to a specific IP and port, listens for a connection on a port, option to send an email of system info when the system boots, and option to start keylogger on boot. Payloads created can only run on the OS that they were created on.
      • Ares
        • Ares is a Python Remote Access Tool.
      • WEASEL
        • WEASEL is a small in-memory implant using Python 3 with no dependencies. The beacon client sends a small amount of identifying information about its host to a DNS zone you control. WEASEL server can task clients to execute pre-baked or arbitrary commands. WEASEL is a stage 1 payload, meant to be difficult to detect and useful for regaining access when your noisy full-featured stages are caught.
    • Dragon: A Windows, non-binding, passive download / exec backdoor

Adversary Simulation Stuff

  • Articles/Blogposts/Writeups
  • Talks/Presentations/Videos
  • Adversary Simulation Tools
    • Self-Contained
      • Caldera
        • CALDERA is an automated adversary emulation system that performs post-compromise adversarial behavior within enterprise networks. It generates plans during operation using a planning system and a pre-configured adversary model based on the Adversarial Tactics, Techniques & Common Knowledge (ATT&CK™) project. These features allow CALDERA to dynamically operate over a set of systems using variable behavior, which better represents how human adversaries perform operations than systems that follow prescribed sequences of actions.
      • DumpsterFire
        • Slides
        • The DumpsterFire Toolset is a modular, menu-driven, cross-platform tool for building repeatable, time-delayed, distributed security events. Easily create custom event chains for Blue Team drills and sensor / alert mapping. Red Teams can create decoy incidents, distractions, and lures to support and scale their operations. Turn paper tabletop exercises into controlled "live fire" range events. Build event sequences ("narratives") to simulate realistic scenarios and generate corresponding network and filesystem artifacts.
      • Metta
        • An information security preparedness tool to do adversarial simulation. This project uses Redis/Celery, python, and vagrant with virtualbox to do adversarial simulation. This allows you to test (mostly) your host based instrumentation but may also allow you to test any network based detection and controls depending on how you set up your vagrants. The project parses yaml files with actions and uses celery to queue these actions up and run them one at a time without interaction.
      • Invoke-Apex
        • Invoke-Apex is a PowerShell-based toolkit consisting of a collection of techniques and tradecraft for use in red team, post-exploitation, adversary simulation, or other offensive security tasks. It can also be useful in identifying lapses in "malicious" activity detection processes for defenders as well.
      • Red Team Automation (RTA)
        • RTA provides a framework of scripts designed to allow blue teams to test their detection capabilities against malicious tradecraft, modeled after MITRE ATT&CK. RTA is composed of python scripts that generate evidence of over 50 different ATT&CK tactics, as well as a compiled binary application that performs activities such as file timestopping, process injections, and beacon simulation as needed.
      • ezEmu
        • ezEmu enables users to test adversary behaviors via various execution techniques. Sort of like an "offensive framework for blue teamers", ezEmu does not have any networking/C2 capabilities and rather focuses on creating local test telemetry.
      • PurpleSharp
        • PurpleSharp is a C# adversary simulation tool that executes adversary techniques with the purpose of generating attack telemetry in monitored Windows environments. Detection engineering teams can leverage this telemetry to identify gaps in visibility as well as test the resilience, improve existing and build new detection analytics.
      • PurpleSpray
        • PurpleSpray is an adversary simulation tool that executes password spray behavior under different scenarios and conditions with the purpose of generating attack telemetry in properly monitored Windows enterprise environments. Blue teams can leverage PurpleSpray to identify gaps in visibility as well as test the resilience, improve existing and build new detection analytics for password spraying attacks.
      • Leonidas
        • This is the repository containing Leonidas, a framework for executing attacker actions in the cloud. It provides a YAML-based format for defining cloud attacker tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and their associated detection properties.
      • 0xsp-Mongoose
        • A unique framework for cybersecurity simulation and red teaming operations, windows auditing for newer vulnerabilities, misconfigurations and privilege escalations attacks, replicate the tactics and techniques of an advanced adversary in a network.
    • Tooling Automation
      • AutoTTP
        • Automated Tactics Techniques & Procedures. Re-running complex sequences manually for regression tests, product evaluations, generate data for researchers & so on can be tedious. I toyed with the idea of making it easier to script Empire (or any frameworks/products/toolkits that provide APIs like Metasploit (RPC), Cobalt-Strike & so on) using IDE like Visual Studio Code (or equivalent). So I started to design AutoTTP. This is still very much work in progress. Test with Empire 2.2.
      • Purple Team ATT&CK Automation
        • Praetorian's public release of our Metasploit automation of MITRE ATT&CK™ TTPs

Pen Testing Specific Stuff(that doesn't fit in PrivEsc/PostEx or Network_Attacks)